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Justin Auciello: The New Wave Planner

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CPTED will change your community. Just ask Sarasota.

In the planning profession, it is commonly known that, while we plan for a bright future, we generally do not expect results quickly. Careful planning takes years to devise, and sometimes even longer to implement and reflect positive change.

However, in Sarasota, the CPTED results were rapid and decisive.

It had worked.

With reductions in crime and increased building activity, the community felt a sense of empowerment.

Between 1990 and 1996, citywide felony crime incidents dropped from 9,228 to 8,426 a percentage change of -8.69, while crimes in the North Trail district dropped from 2,182 to 1,537, a percentage change of -29.56 (Zahm et al.). Comparing both reductions, this demonstrates that crime displacement did not likely occur, as crime rates dropped throughout the entire city.

As expected, an inverse relationship between crime rates and building permits appeared, and in the North Trail district, building activity increased from 14 permits issued in 1989 to 39 issued in 1995, resulting in an additional 88,158 square feet of building square footage (Id).

Concurrently, the city improved parks and other defined public spaces, sidewalks, landscaping, and lighting, which mirrored private investment in new boutique shops, facade upgrades, and new creative architecture.

Issues Raised

This case is overflowing with important successes related to the planning practice, including:

  • Consensus building within the community;
  • Efficient teamwork between planning and law enforcement professionals;
  • Creating incentives for developers to build in accordance with CPTED techniques;
  • Reducing crime, but not through target-hardening (i.e. security fences, unattractive metal bars placed on windows, etc.); rather, through softer design techniques;
  • Minimizing exposure to premise liability lawsuits;
  • Appeasing politicians via a low-cost, highly effective solution; and,
  • Most importantly, redesigning a district where people can simply walk around at night and not be worried about victimization.

The Sarasota plan was tailored specifically to the main corridor into the city, a very significant symbol of the city as a whole, because great streets, in addition to stimulating a sense of place and promoting economic development, are vibrant and well  maintained.

An additional success is that the plan would not have worked unless all stakeholders were actively involved during the planning and early stages.

“Hopeless despair” in the North Trail district was the prevailing attitude prior to implementation, and the hopelessness was so severe that it extended from the street into the planning office.

With the CPTED buzz abound, more people started to pay attention (Jane Jacob’s “eyes on the street” theory) and care for their environment (the antithesis of deleterious outcomes at the final stages of the “broken windows theory”). In turn, the perpetrators know that they are being watched.

CPTED will generate a hopeful—and vigilant—community vibe

The mere creation of a CPTED program expanded the social fabric of the community and revived hope, placing a stake in businesses, property owners, politicians, law enforcement, and planners. Without the input and support of these parties, the program would probably have been marginally successful at best. Particularly, citizens are the true experts because they have plenty of concerns and can pin-point ongoing trouble spots.

After the Sarasota program began, citizens became more aware and less tolerant of criminal behavior. This is evidenced by an increase of police calls between 1992 and 1993, when the program had first been implemented; those with a stake in the community did indeed become more aware (Carter et al.).

CPTED regulations are powerful, effective, and will engage the community

Along with the general successes of the program, the CPTED review process built into the city’s zoning ordinance is perhaps the most ingenious way to ensure compliance. Criminals look to exploit environmental design faults in order to enhance the likelihood that their act will be successful without detection.

The CPTED program began with retrofitting public places (along with requiring a review for future projects) with the gamut of design techniques. This is significant because it showed the private sector that the government was serious about reviving the district, resulting in a trickle-down public involvement (Id).

The implementation also demonstrated that the CPTED design standards are cost-effective and could actually increase revenues for all stakeholders because of the shared benefit of safety.

More lighting in parking lots and public streets, along with mandatory low buffering and less opaque fencing, lower shrubbery, and more balconies and patios to increase “eyes on the street” all act collectively to create a safer environment, with the ultimate goal of economic development. People and businesses alike will not flourish in a dangerous environment.

With incentives, developers will work with the municipality

Another enormous success of the program is the incentive it creates for businesses to implement the CPTED review recommendations. While businesses are not required to implement the recommendations of the CPTED review, the city created a caveat to the rule to create a disincentive not to participate: allocated redevelopment funds earmarked for businessess are subject to CPTED review.

As part of the program, the city instituted a “Small Business CPTED Grant Program,” with the intent of identifying businessess that had been victimized and allocating funds for a variety of safety oriented improvements (Id). If the cost-effectiveness or proven results of the program are not enough, business owners introducing CPTED principles to their properties are less likely to face a lawsuit from someone victimized on their premises.

CPTED regulations can reduce legal liabilities

Both public and private sector entities have been held liable for poor security on their premises. CPTED empowers local governments and community stakeholders to not only protect their environment, but also their finances.

It is a preventive, an intelligent, and a scientifically based approach. Gerda R. Wekerle and Carolyn Whitzman, the authors of Safe Cities: Guidelines for Planning, Design, and Management, accurately sum up the financial advantages of CPTED: “When measured against the cost of potential settlements to the victims of crime, the costs of crime prevention through environmental design and community based solutions begin to make economic and social sense.”

CPTED should be recognized as a smart growth component

Smart growth initiatives aim to create walkable, livable, and sustainable communities, with a variety of housing choices, land uses, and public facilities in proximity to public transportation choices. While wholly new developments can be designed with smart growth tenets, the most effective projects are redevelopment oriented and located in areas with existing infrastructure. As I wrote above, people do not thrive in dangerous conditions.

Many jurisdictions, including my state, New Jersey, provide a litany of inducements to spur smart growth oriented redevelopments projects in urban areas. I am hopeful that municipal decision markers will consider requiring CPTED reviews, or perhaps implement  full-scale CPTED regulations in conjunction with redevelopment initiatives.

CPTED provides proven results and assurance to municipalities looking to attract economic investment. That is perhaps the greatest strength of CPTED: the Sarasota model can be applied to almost every jurisdiction that is looking to reduce crime and increase investment.

Sources:

Carter, Sherry, Stanley L. Carter, and Andrew L. Dannenberg. “Zoning Out Crime and Improving Community Health in Sarasota, Florida: ‘Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design.’” American Journal of Public Health Vol 93 (Sep2003).

Wekerle, Gerda R. and Whitzman, Carolyn. Safe Cities: Guideliens for Planning, Design, and Management. Hoboken: Wiley, 1994.

Zahm, Diane; Sherry Carter; Al Zelinka. “Safe Place Design” Transitions 1997.

Criticisms and conclusions are up next.


Please follow my entire CPTED trail:


1 year ago

May 12, 2009  

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CPTED IN ACTION: SARASOTA, FLORIDA

Please read my April 17, 2009 post, “What is CPTED, and what can it do for my municipality?,” for an overview of the CPTED program.

After the formation of a solid, working coalition between citizens, law enforcement, and planning professionals, the North Trail section of Sarasota, Florida was taken back from criminals and now enjoys social and economic vitality.

The North Trial section, which encompasses 18% of the city’s area (2.2 square miles), functions as a “gateway” to the downtown (Central Business District) and the pristine Gulf Cost beaches. Prior to municipal action in the early 1990s, visitors to Sarasota had to pass through this ramshackle area to shop in the downtown or sunbathe at the beach, where an abundance of decaying motels and businesses, built in the years post WWII, resided (Zahm et. al.).

Most of these businesses failed to improve throughout time, and thus, per the city’s Zoning Ordinance, were non-conforming uses. Due to the non-conformities, the active zoning standards “prevented or greatly increased the cost of renovating old businesses or building new ones” (Carter et al). Consequently, the economic corrosion of this area and the perception that “nobody cared” created a prime opportunity for criminals, including drugs dealers and prostitutes.

Local officials became concerned that these problems could spread to contiguous areas, possibly leading to a constant state of fear and ultimately disinvestment throughout the entire city. Public concern led to the allocation of funds through the city’s Comprehensive Growth Management Plan.

Dubbed the “North Trial Sector Study”, the city’s planning staff determined that a redevelopment of the blighted area could not proceed without an analysis of the locations and frequency of criminal activity, as conducted by law enforcement. During the formative stages of the study, an initiative, “Gateway 2000,” a collaborative effort by various community stakeholders, was already underway with the intent of outlining the revitalization of the North Trail gateway.

Naturally, both studies were thereafter meshed, and as a result, the Sarasota CPTED Task Force was born, with the goal of overseeing the creation of a revitalized North Trail, along with using it as a tool for future implementation throughout the city.

With political support, police, planners, and community stakeholders working in concert, and formal plans adopted, implementation was next.

The police began the process by “sweeping the streets” to arrest drug dealers and prostitutes. Local residents began to notice the increased police presence, and their confidence began to build. The benefits flowed before any legislative enactments were made: residents began to improve their own properties, a merchants association was created, and the city’s Governing Body allocated previously budgeted money to improve the median and sides of the gateway road (Carter et al).

In order to educate the public and garner additional support, the planning commission held eight workshops focused on a variety of issues important to the community and what they wanted to see change. Zahm et al. stated that “the major concerns identified by the public were crime (particularly prostitution), urban design (it was ugly), future land uses (more goods and services) and code enforcement (lack of maintenance. The desired future was to improve the area, not change it” (Zahm et al.).

The workshops also highlighted how proper physical and landscape design is essential to reducing the likelihood of criminal activity.

The city created a special zoning district to spur redevelopment activity, with increased pedestrian friendly initiatives and incentives for mixed-use development and innovative land uses, all of which were focused on the implementation of CPTED principals so future development could be designed to minimize the likelihood for victimization.

The zoning regulations for the new district were enacted in October 1992 and continue today. Each project, even those permitted as-of-right and variance-free, undergoes a CPTED audit by representatives of both the police department and planning commission. Applicants developing properties from scratch or rehabilitating structures are not required, however, to implement the design recommendations, but there are tax incentives provided to encourage conformance. The CPTED review follows its three overarching tenets: natural surveillance, natural access control, territorial reinforcement, along with regular maintenance (Zahm et al.). Thankfully, most property owners, probably sensing the potential for immense benefits, complied (Carter et al).

The CPTED auditors check for appropriate exterior lighting, proper care of landscaping to prevent hiding spots for criminals, incentives for constructing patios and balconies (to increase eyes on the street), and perhaps the biggest incentive for developers: a builder may exceed the maximum height permitted within the district only if the building is mixed-use and includes residential on the third level (retail on the bottom floor, commercial on the second). High traffic areas, including parking and pedestrian dominated areas, are scrutinized in order to minimize the risk of victimization. For example, parking lot landscaping “must either be of low height (a maximum of 2.5 feet) or use trees with canopies having a minimum clearance of 5 feet, to eliminate hiding places” (MRSC).

Each individual criterion adds up to the net effect of reducing the likelihood of victimization through minimizing the opportunity of criminal activity. From its institution in the early 1990s, it has worked.

Results? Issues raised? Criticisms?

Stay tuned..

Sources:

Carter, Sherry, Stanley L. Carter, and Andrew L. Dannenberg. “Zoning Out Crime and Improving Community Health in Sarasota, Florida: ‘Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design.’” American Journal of Public Health Vol 93 (Sep2003).

Zahm, Diane; Sherry Carter; Al Zelinka. “Safe Place Design” Transitions 1997.

Municipal Research and Services Center of Washington (MRSC).


1 year ago

May 1, 2009  

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What is CPTED, and what can it do for my municipality?

In Thinking About Crime, James Q. Wilson observed, “if a child is delinquent because his family made him so or his friends encourage him to be so, it is hard to conceive what society might do about this attitudes. No one knows how a government might restore affections, stability and fair discipline to a family that rejects these characteristics.” (Poyner 1983) Researchers began to challenge the assumptions of Wilson and other doubters of governmental intervention. They began to look beyond merely changing the behavior of criminals, and started to look for ways to reduce the likelihood of victimization through innovative concepts, instead of relying exclusively on law enforcement to carry the burden.

This outlook planted the seed for a program called Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), which has begun to resonate deeply amongst community planners. Some cities implemented CPTED policies in the 1980s, a time when “entrepreneurial” cities began competing for business. It has continued to be an effective tool, and the new smart growth movement will continue to make CPTED an attractive, low-cost, worthy program for municipalities.

CPTED applies the combination of design changes and community organization (representing both the built and social environments, respectively) to reduce the opportunities for, and the likelihood of, criminal activity. It seeks to create an environment less tolerant and more resistant to criminal behavior.

Reducing crime through proper design is the ultimate goal.

The program centers on a working partnership between criminologists and planning and design professionals. In his seminal book Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, (1971) C. Ray Jeffery advanced Oscar Newman’s “defensible space” (defined as bringing the environment under control of its residents) concept to formulate the CPTED program. Newman designed and successfully demonstrated methods to reduce the likelihood of criminal victimization by providing people with defensible space in inner-city housing projects.

The CPTED tenets include natural access control (controlling the ingress and egress of individuals through the placement of landscaping, fences, lighting, entrances, and exists as to leave a criminal without any rational for trespassing if stopped), natural surveillance (the arrangement of physical features and people through the intelligent placement of doors, windows, lighting, and common outdoor areas to decrease the ability of a criminal to act without being detected) and territorial reinforcement (the use of physical features that expresses ownership, such as fences, signage, and landscaping to clearly delineate public, semi-public, and private space so citizens know where they are).

This program is the antithesis of the gated community concept!

Newman applied his tenets to high-crime housing projects, but CPTED has evolved to rework entire cities. Since CPTED is intrinsically malleable, planning professionals have added their own elements, including activity support (placement of kiosks in heavily traveled areas to promote news about community events to demonstrate community pride and organization.) The application of all of the above tenets reduces crime and increases the public’s awareness sine “the physical changes and raised social expectations created an environment less tolerant of criminal behavior.” (Carter et al., 2003)  CPTED applications seek to create a more dynamic, integrative, design oriented community program to give everyone a stake in their neighborhoods to reduce crime, rather than relying on pure design techniques.

Early criminology studies had indicated that there is a strong, tri-angular relationship between interpersonal activities, the build environment, and crime. While there have been a number of studies through the eyes of people with different agendas, all have come to the conclusion that a well-designed community with involved citizens can reduce the likelihood of criminal activity. Jane Jacobs, in her book The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961), stresses that one of the best attributes of city neighborhoods is the safety that results from people being familiar with each other. These types of neighborhoods generally have mixed commercial and residential uses that generate plenty of human activity and interaction. In turn, the dynamic atmosphere acts as a deterrent to criminal activity. Jacobs coined this as the “eyes on the street” theory.

Studies have shown that police protection generally reduces crime, but it is difficult for patrols to stop crimes, such as home burglaries or street robberies, because of the disproportionate amount of resources alloted for a geographical area. Communities began to view Jacob’s eyes on the street theory as an important deterrent to crime in response to the inability of police to stop a majority of criminal activity. This theory is deeply rooted in CPTED methodology.

Crime is a subject everyone is concerned about and would like to reduce, but if crime abatement programs are too expensive to implement and operate, it may drop in political importance. CPTED addresses the larger issue of the omnipresent crime problem (especially in older, more vulnerable downtown areas) through a low-cost, intuitive program.

The next post will detail CPTED application in the North Trail section of Sarasota, Florida, an area that—prior to CPTED— had been plagued by drugs, prostitution, violence, and a litnay of quality of life problems.

Sources:

Carter, Sherry, Stanley L. Carter, and Andrew L. Dannenberg. “Zoning Out Crime and Improving Community Health in Sarasota, Florida: ‘Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design.’” American Journal of Public Health Vol 93 (Sep2003).

Poyner, Barry. Design against Crime. London: Butterworths, 1983.



1 year ago

April 17, 2009  

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Fighting crime in college park: The long and winding road

2/2 — Please read my April 2, 2009 post, “Murder in College Park, MD: The Tipping Point”

In the aftermath of the Malstrom murder, the stakeholders—students, city residents, politicians, and the university administration—reached a consensus that the crime problem had reached its apogee. Solutions were in order, and of course, many called for increased police patrols, viewing law enforcement as the panacea for criminal activity. However, in 2003 and the years preceding, that solution had never been easy to implement.

Still today, the city is served primarily by the Prince George’s County Police Department (PGPD), with the University of Maryland Police Department (UMPD) providing coverage to the areas only contiguous to the university (although patrols have expanded by virtue of a joint jurisdictional agreement). During my tenure in College Park, and perhaps years or decades before me, jurisdictional issues had always been a problem. After the Malstrom murder, a core group of stakeholders lobbied the city council to study the feasibility of a city police force. A majority of the city council was concerned that the tax increases would be insurmountable for the city’s residents. Hence, as is not surprising, political concerns were trumping safety concerns. Instead, the governing body worked on forging a joint jurisdictional agreement between both police departments to increase patrols, and by late 2005, the agreement had been implemented. As a temporary “solution,” in November 2003, the city council approved hiring contract police officers to patrol downtown and the student neighborhoods during the vulnerable overnight hours. Perhaps effective, but merely a political move to stymie criticism.

Meanwhile, while the university administration had been working with the city council to find ways to reduce the prevalence of violent crimes, it had held on to its view that increasing crime rate was no different than other universities in metropolitan areas. Even if true, this is not a responsible reason for acting nonchalantly.

According to crime statistics released by the PGPD, in College Park, homicides increased 30 percent, from zero in 2001 to three in 2002. Assaults increased 15.8 percent from 38 to 44. Rapes, however, decreased from 6 to 1. Motor vehicle theft increased 19.6 percent from 168 to 201 thefts. Burglaries increased 3.4 percent from 174 to 180, and robberies decreased from 53 to 51. (The Diamondback, December 04, 2003)

In late 2002/early 2003, the data was significant for a few reasons. While some city and police officials had noted that these numbers are probably not indicative of a crime problem and are normal compared to other municipalities in the county, there still appeared to be quite a security issue when there are dramatic crime spikes in most categories (with the exception of rapes). While it is conceded that crime will occur even with the best crime preventions programs and police force, this should have never been an argument against innovation and implementing progressive crime prevention strategies. Police officers (especially contracted officers from different jurisdictions) cannot be relied upon to carry the entire burden, although they are clearly a significant component of an overall crime prevention program.

No one can deny that the coalition of stakeholders has made tremendous progress on the crime prevention front over the past six to seven years. While it took some time to wrangle the political support out of the governing body and from Upper Marlboro (the County Executive and other leaders had to sign off on the joint jurisdictional agreement), the politicians had no choice be to acquiesce to constituent demands. To wit: city residents were so frustrated about the crime problem that they narrowly passed a non-binding “public safety referendum” in 2004, which would essentially amount to a $40 per person tax on supplemental police services. It’s uncommon for voters, on any level, to support a tax increase, even if it’s clearly minimal, but with crime being a paramount concern, a majority of the residents felt that action was needed—and quickly.

However, I am not going to bestow the accolades upon the political operation, as in this instance, substantive action had been taken on account of a groundswell of demands from students, the press, and the general public—purely reactionary to political winds. Understandably, an over-arching objective of serving in public office is to be re-elected, but in a small city, where crime had reached a boiling point (even if perceived), true courage would have been to sacrifice oneself for the betterment of the community and take the issue seriously. After all, the local politicians are all potential victims.

There may have been an outward appearance of the city council acting proactively to devise and implement innovation crime prevention programs, but in reality, the substantive action did not come until early 2006, when the politicians truly had no choice but to react to statistics indicating that crime had reached a five-year high in 2005, including a 34% increase in city robberies. A March 28, 2006 Diamondback staff editorial, entitled “Underwhelming city council crime reaction worrisome,” opened with these unsympathetic words:

A five year crime high in the city, and all the city council members want to talk about are airbag thefts, traffic patterns and gang activity, rather than robberies – the crimes that truly plague the city. When Maj. Kevin Davis, District 1 commander for the Prince George’s County Police, presented last year’s record-high statistics to the council last week, they reacted with a lot less concern than one would expect from the leaders of a city where crime is a constant concern.

It goes on:

When it comes to public safety, something that comes up constantly in this area, the city has shown a lack of ability to produce substantial results. And the seemingly nonchalant way city officials took the news of record-high robberies certainly doesn’t show anything different.

Recently, the city and count have both made improvements to city law enforcement, including the city devoting funds to contract county police to patrol the city and the county devoting a robbery suppression team to the city. However, statistics clearly show there is far more work to be done.

Choice words from the student newspaper, but all 100% accurate. From the Malstrom murder in 2002 to today, as one of the most widely circulated papers in College Park (it’s not just on campus; it’s circulated throughout the city) The Diamondback has been consistently framing the crime issue and keeping the university, city council, and multiple police agencies accountable for inaction over time. Even so, it has not just been The Diamondback, but also the students, city council student liaisons, and activists who have kept accountability an issue.

Although, since graduating in 2002, I have been living in New Jersey (and thus three hours from College Park), I have been working remotely to at least stimulate some dialogue on the crime prevention front. Since 2003, I have penned multiple opinion and Letter to the Editor pieces in The Diamondback and shared my studies, reports, strategies, and general observations with both the Student Government Association and University Senate.

Why would I help?

Well, I felt compelled to share my ideas, not just because the city was my home for four years and I have fond memories of my time there, but as a victim of a violent robbery in an off-campus neighborhood, perhaps my ideas could actually help to prevent future victimization. I had felt a burning responsibility to apply my passion and assist in any possible way.

I am confident that my actions have at least helped with brainstorming, even though, as a consequence of living quite a distance away, I have been unable to interact directly with the stakeholders.

As a neophyte—yet eager—urban planning student at Rutgers University in the fall of 2003, I had begun to realize the only way to effect change is through innovative measures, as well as, of course, good old-fashioned hard work, dedication, and persistence. In the planning world, I was told, you may have the greatest plan, but if the politics “don’t work,” your plan will just be relegated to the shelf.  I determined that, if I had accepted this, then I would most certainly have a disappointing career of researching, crafting, and innovating, but ultimately failing in the end because, for whatever reason, the governing body would just not be supportive. Certainly, you have to adjust for political reasons, and that is completely understood; however, there are some changes for which you just have to fight.

With this attitude in mind, I felt compelled to become involved in contributing my thoughts and budding planning knowledge to the city and campus in which I spent four years, from 1998-2002. Within a month of beginning school, I began reading about the interplay between law enforcement, innovative crime prevention measures, and planning.

Even before planning school, I had always known that there is a direct relationship between the built environment and crime. Of course, it is obvious that crime rates are typically higher in depressed neighborhoods, but should this be accepted as a life sentence? Absolutely not. If police patrols alone are not effective in a high crime area, then why not gather all stakeholders and develop a comprehensive crime prevention program to attack the problem? Again, law enforcement is effective—but it is not the end game—and the only way to induce developers to become engaged in redevelopment/revitalization activities is to work on actively reducing crime. While College Park has seen some major development over the recent years, just think about how far improvements to the downtown area have been pushed back because of both the perception and reality of criminal activity.

Throughout the fall of 2003, I read weekly accounts of violent crimes in College Park, but after seeing a Diamondback report about a stabbing in the Knox Towers—an off-campus apartment complex, occupied by students and on the cusp of the downtown—I had to act. In November 2003, I wrote an op-ed in the same publication, in which I implored the university and city council alike to work collectively and immediately formulate an inexpensive, yet potentially effective, method: student/resident safety patrols.

Why?

Presence.

Patrols members would not be armed, of course, but would wear reflective vests, carry radios and have contact with police, and be situated in those areas most vulnerable, as identified by police crime statistics and community knowledge. It’s simple. As Jane Jacobs had written about in The Death and Life of Great American Cities, a major failure of urban renewal is that vibrant neighborhoods had been obliterated to accommodate highways and other projects, thus removing eyes on the street. Criminology studies are clear: criminals are generally rationale actors, and consider committing crimes after completing a cost/benefit analysis, even if it’s for just a split second. Therefore, as logic dictates, increase capable guardians (people) in a high crime area, and crime should be deterred.

In April 2004, I learned that the SGA organized a community watch and, according to reports in The Diamondback, patrolled the city throughout 2004 and early 2005. I am not sure if it continued beyond early 2005, but it most certainly was an innovative, yet simple, step in the right direction.

In 2006, after realizing that the city, university, and police agencies had not taken enough substantive actions in the war against crime, I wrote a number of pieces in The Diamondback, detailing various crime prevention strategies that are politically feasible. As an urban planner, I had always framed the crime issue around redevelopment, and my March 30, 2006 opinion piece, entitled “Reducing crime through smart design,” opened with the following:

I applaud the College Park City Council for its recent redevelopment discussions, and I must note that the EPA revitalization study is a major step toward invigorating the Route 1 corridor. College Park contains all the necessary ingredients to flourish as a world-class “college town” capable of attracting not only the brightest students, but also residents seeking the same experience.

Redevelopment, however, will not be successful unless College Park is a safe and aesthetically pleasing place where the perception and reality of criminal activity is low, and with robbery rates at a five-year high, a triumphant redevelopment seems far off.

And, as I highlighted in a February 2, 2007 Letter to the Editor piece in The Diamondback:

[T]he burgeoning redevelopment of both the campus and the off-campus areas will quickly expand and solidify the university’s competitive advantage among its peers. A heightened perception and reality of crime, however, could have disastrous impacts on all the university’s positive attributes, in addition to hindering the redevelopment process.

While the intent had always been about methods to reduce crime, I understood that the issue had to be encapsulated within an overall objective, such as the need to take a holistic approach toward redevelopment, with the hopes of creating a groundswell of political support. Doubtful, perhaps, but harping on just crime had not seemed to create much of an impact between 2002 and 2006.

Among the suggestions in my pieces:

  • Formulate a sustainable plan of attack;
  • Create  a Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (aka, CPTED—a detailed analysis of the program will follow in the next post) Subcommittee within the city council in order to determine which crime prevention methods could work, and then codify findings within the Zoning Ordinance to provide the legal “teeth”;
  • Improve on UMPD and PGPD patrol saturations by instituting tactical deployments to the highest crime areas, with the overall intent of inducing fear in criminals. (Still ongoing after 9/11, the New York Police Department does this on a daily basis. You may have noticed a caravan of police vehicles with sirens and lights ablaze in the most vulnerable sections of Manhattan at times—this is the tactical deployment method.);
  • Increase the number of “blue lights” and live surveillance cameras (both of which had already been in place since at least the 1990s), especially in the most isolated and vulnerable areas, as identified by crime statistics; and,
  • Improve the landscaping and lighting conditions in the area between the Metro station and the campus (predominately a student neighborhood, there was a strong pattern of criminal victimization here) and institute a shuttle from the Metro station that would transverse the student neighborhoods.

During this period, I shared my thoughts directly with a few members of the SGA and University Senate, as I was certainly not the only person actively seeking solutions. In 2007, the University Senate began the process of preparing a “security policy report” by soliciting input from students, faculty, staff, and law enforcement, with the goal of cementing security policy into the foundation of the institution—a clearly holistic approach that would take into account input from stakeholders and formulate a future direction for campus security. I considered this to be a major breakthrough on the student/administration relations front.

Around this same time, as I observed in a March 30, 2007 Diamondback Letter to the Editor:

The University Police Department, in partnership with the city of College Park, unveiled a “safe route” program, dubbed “Preferred Route,” with the intent of providing a safe path from the student neighborhoods to the east of Route 1 to the College Park Metro Station. Crime prevention measures have been deployed along the safe route, including enhanced lighting, landscaping improvements, and emergency blue phones.”

Even though I applauded the Preferred Route program, I stressed that “it is merely a component of a sorely needed comprehensive crime prevention package,” as it, as well as other methods, must be reinforced by a CPTED ordinance, “which would provide a legal mechanism to mandate a full crime prevention design review for all proposed developments in College Park, in addition to requiring the city to improve lighting, landscaping and its structures to comply with CPTED standards.”

While there have been a number of crime prevention improvements instituted in the city over the years, but the governing body has yet to codify a comprehensive crime prevention program into the Zoning Ordinance. As such, other than complying with the standard lighting, landscaping, and general design procedures in the Zoning Ordinance, developers do not have to employ sure-fire crime prevention measures in their future projects. This is a concern.

I do have to commend all parties for working on this pressing issue over the years, including the UMPD and PGPD, both of which have worked with the community and established a variety of practical and innovative crime prevention strategies; however,  a substantial number of accolades should be bestowed upon The Diamondback for not only providing a forum for on-going dialogue, but most importantly, acting as a daily watch-dog on the crime prevention beat and ensuring accountability. Of course, significant credit is also due to students, student liaisons to the city council, and community activists, all of whom pressed the issue and demanded solutions (and still do!).

The issue is not over, however. Crime is still a concern in College Park.

What can cities do—especially with the potential for innovation that emerging technologies provide us—to either reduce crime or prevent it from even brewing up from minimal levels?

Stay tuned for the next post.

1 year ago

April 10, 2009  

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Murder in College Park, MD: The Tipping Point

To continue with the childhood connection to my planning career, I’ve also always had an deep interest in law enforcement, which may in fact be in my blood, considering that my maternal grandfather and two uncles were police officers. Of course, with the exception of the classical fantasies that kids have about future professions, I never wanted to actually serve within the front lines of law enforcement, although I still occasionally daydream about being a detective and solving cases.

Just like in the present day, as the years progressed, my interest in the subject had always been much more academic, i.e. theories behind policing, penology, the justice system, the criminal mind, and crime prevention strategies. In fact, as an undergraduate, I was just six credits short of adding another major, Criminology and Criminal Justice, to my diploma. But, as a graduate student, I created a concentration for myself in Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)—more on that later.

So, you may be asking, this is a blog about planning, and not law enforcement, so where is the connection between the two?

Turns out, there is a direct interplay, and this will be explained much throughout this blog.

For now, I’ll explain how I put the two together.

I graduated from the University of Maryland, College Park (UMCP), the flagship institution of the University of Maryland System, in May 2002. College Park is a city in Prince George’s County located only about 5 minutes from the District of Columbia. In fact, Route 1, which is a major thoroughfare into DC, cuts directly through College Park and serves as the major commercial corridor for students and residents alike.

The UMCP campus, which consists of hundreds of acres and contains such diverse uses ranging from a mini farm to a nuclear reactor, is completely contained—that is, the vast majority of the campus does not spread through city neighborhoods. And, it is well known for its sports, most notably (or perhaps notoriously) the basketball team’s 2002 NCAA National Championship.

Although not on the same aesthetic and “fun” level as classic college towns like Ann Arbor, Michigan (The University of Michigan), Charlottesville, Virginia (The University of Virginia), or Chapel Hill, North Carolina (The University of North Caroline), College Park is an archetypal college town, with a small—yet vibrant, attractive, and pedestrian-friendly—downtown, packed with bars, restaurants, delis, takeout restaurants, specialty shops, national chains, and a standard of all college towns, an over-sized bookstore.

Beyond the downtown, the Route 1 corridor extends to both the north and south, with the northern portion of the city along Route 1 characterized by a mixture of land uses, varying from auto body shops on small lots to sprawling shopping centers. As you drive through the northern portion of Route 1 to reach the downtown, you instantly notice the land use differences, as it’s generally urban sprawl vs. pedestrian-friendly mixed-use.

The vast majority of the city’s visitors, however, are not interested in the northern portion of Route 1; the target begins just as you pass by the campus’ first entrance off Route 1 south.

It is not without surprise that, with all College Park has to offer, the city is a magnet for those seeking a good time, whether it be drinking at one of the bars, enjoying a meal, or watching a basketball game at the Comcast Center. While the DC Metro area has a number of destinations, it is widely known, especially amongst the college age cohort, that College Park, with countless “open door policy” parties, is the place to be on Thursday, Friday, or Saturday nights.

With parties comes intoxication, and intoxication leads to vulnerability. Even without the inebriation factor, a packed college party is almost always a volatile environment—ripe for confrontation.

During my tenure there, from August 1998 through September 2002, crime had always been a fact of life. Without fail, The Diamondback, the daily student newspaper, reported accounts of theft, robberies, assaults, or sexual assaults on a weekly basis. Certainly, any campus, with its concentrations of young people, has its share of criminal activity; college students are just easy targets, but in College Park, it seemed, during my tenure, everyone knew of someone who had been victimized

Incidentally, beyond providing an overview of College Park student life, I am not going to explain why, in my opinion, crime levels were unusually high in College Park until the next blog post.

Students, police, residents, and local politicians had always “accepted” crime as an unfortunate fact of life.

However, that all changed shortly after I graduated in May 2002.

During Homecoming 2002, Brandon Malstrom, a UMCP student, was stabbed and killed at an off-campus party. Student deaths, while rare, do occasionally occur, as did three in my last year (one from an overdose, and the other two due to a tornado). A student murder, on the other hand, is beyond rare. It strikes fear into every student, and perhaps even more so the parents.

This event served as the tipping point, with intense media attention and pressure on the city, county police force, and the university administration to assuage the fears and devise a solution to a constantly simmering problem.

Clearly, law enforcement is not a panacea for all of society’s ills, but it does share in the overall responsibility to work with the community and act creatively to combat crime.  Moreover, the city, its residents, and the university all are stakeholders and have an incentive to ensure a safe community. Without community consensus and action, problems tend to continue and exacerbate, ultimately reaching a critical breaking point, as it did with the Malstrom murder.

Sounds like common sense, doesn’t it?

While it does, its simplicity belies the reality of human nature: people are naturally protective of their flock, and any interference is tantamount to a threat against natural order. Coalition naturally form as a reaction to a need to work together, not out of desire, but merely necessity. With the murder, all College Park stakeholders had no choice but to work collectively.

Although I had graduated months earlier, I was still reading the online version of The Diamondback, and I was immensely interested in following this story. Having such a personal connection to College Park, I began to think critically about why this happened and how the ongoing crime problem could be mitigated. Surely, I thought, police saturation was helpful, but unsustainable and politically adverse. Where the students going to stop partying? Absolutely not, so the “targets” would continue to exist.

Then, I began thinking that perhaps the most effective method was to institute additional safety programs (beyond the rarely used “Call A Ride”), or maybe even go as far as altering the built environment in such a way to reduce the likelihood of criminal activity, a consideration probably due to my urban planning studies at the time.

With all stakeholders finally working together (or, at least the appearance of it occurring), the potential for change was bright, and the leaders most certainly had a mandate to devise solutions.

The crime problem had reached its tipping point, so the environment was ripe for innovative ideas, beyond just law enforcement tackling the problem solo….

1 year ago

April 2, 2009  

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